dataflow-analysis

Perform intra-procedural dataflow analysis to track how data flows within functions.

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Install skill "dataflow-analysis" with this command: npx skills add vulhunt-re/skills/vulhunt-re-skills-dataflow-analysis

Dataflow Analysis

Perform intra-procedural dataflow analysis to track how data flows within functions.

When to use

  • Track if a function parameter flows to a function call argument

  • Track if a function call's output flows to another function call's argument

  • Find taint propagation paths (e.g., user input reaching dangerous functions)

  • Detect vulnerabilities like command injection, buffer overflows

Instructions

Using the VulHunt MCP tools, open the project (open_project ) and run the following Lua query (query_project ).

To perform dataflow analysis, use project:calls_matching{} :

local calls = project:calls_matching({ to = <target_call>, where = function(caller) return caller:named("<function_name>") and caller:has_call(<target_call>) end, using = { -- Annotate caller parameters parameters = {var:named "first_param", }, -- Annotate callees callees = { ["malloc"] = {inputs = {var:named "size"}}, ["strlen"] = {output = var:named "len", inputs = {}}, ["check_len"] = {inputs = {var:sanitised()}} } } })

local results = {}

for _, c in ipairs(calls) do local entry = { caller_name = c.caller.name, call_address = c.call_address, }

if c.inputs[1] and c.inputs[1].annotation then entry.arg1_annotation = c.inputs[1].annotation entry.arg1_source = c.inputs[1].origin.source_address end

if c.inputs[2] and c.inputs[2].annotation then entry.arg2_annotation = c.inputs[2].annotation entry.arg2_source = c.inputs[2].origin.source_address end

if c.output then entry.return_annotation = c.output.annotation end

table.insert(results, entry) end

return results

Possible values for <target_call> :

  • A string, e.g. "system"

  • An AddressValue

  • VulHunt APIs return addresses as AddressValue instances

  • Create one with AddressValue.new(<hex_addr>) (e.g., <hex_addr> = 0x1234 )

  • A regex, e.g. {matching = "<regex>", kind = "symbol"}

  • A byte pattern, e.g. {matching = "41544155", kind = "bytes"}

Inputs and output are of type OperandInfo (see operand-info.md). Origins are of type OperandOrigin (see operand-origin.md).

Annotations

  • var:named "x"

  • Tags a variable with the name "x". This tag follows the data through the function, allowing later checks on where it ends up (e.g., which function argument it flows into).

  • _

  • Placeholder for variables that don't need to be tracked.

  • var:sanitised()

  • Stops taint propagation when a tainted variable flows through that function argument.

The annotation set in using appears in c.inputs[N].annotation in the results. For example, if annotated with var:named "cmd" , then c.inputs[1].annotation == "cmd"

indicates the first argument came from that tracked variable.

Examples

Function parameter -> Function argument

Example 1: Buffer overflow via memcpy

C code snippet:

void vulnerable_function(int len, char *path) { char buffer[256]; memcpy(buffer, path, len); }

Lua query:

local calls = project:calls_matching{ to = "memcpy", using = { parameters = {var:named "len", var:named "path"} } }

local findings = {} for _, call in ipairs(calls) do local len_src = call.inputs[3] local data_src = call.inputs[2]

if (len_src ~= nil and len_src.annotation == "len") or (data_src ~= nil and data_src.annotation == "path") then table.insert(findings, { caller_address = tostring(call.caller_address), call_address = tostring(call.call_address), }) end end

return findings

Example 2: Command injection via snprintf -> system

C code snippet:

void vulnerable_function(char *cmd) { char buffer[256];

snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "sh -c %s", cmd); system(buffer); }

Lua query:

local calls = project:calls_matching{ to = "system", where = function(caller) return caller:has_call("snprintf") end, using = { callees = {snprintf = {inputs = {var:named "cmd", _, _}}} } }

local findings = {} for _, call in ipairs(calls) do local src = call.inputs[1]

if src ~= nil and src.annotation == "cmd" then table.insert(findings, { caller_address = tostring(call.caller_address), call_address = tostring(call.call_address), }) end end

return findings

Use cases

Command injection

Shell commands built from format strings

Find calls to system() where the argument was built using snprintf() :

local calls = project:calls_matching{ to = "system", -- system(cmd) where = function(caller) return caller:has_call("snprintf") -- snprintf(cmd, ...) end, using = { callees = {snprintf = {inputs = {var:named "cmd", _, _}}} } }

local findings = {} for _, call in ipairs(calls) do local src = call.inputs[1]

if src ~= nil and src.annotation == "cmd" then table.insert(findings, { snprintf_address = tostring(src.origin.source_address), caller_name = tostring(call.caller.name), caller_address = tostring(call.caller_address), call_address = tostring(call.call_address), }) end end

return findings

NOTE: Only change the propagated value if the source changes.

Returns a JSON object containing:

  • snprintf_address is the address of the call site to snprintf

  • caller_address is the address of the function that makes the call

  • call_address is the address of the call site to system (the code block address where the call is made)

References

  • calls-matching-param.md - Input format for calls_matching

  • calls-matching-table.md - Structure of the returned table from calls_matching

  • regex-matcher.md - Regex matching utilities

URLs to additional documentation pages are available at https://vulhunt.re/llm.txt

Related Skills

  • functions (/functions ) - Use this skill to find target functions by name, address, or pattern before performing dataflow analysis

  • call-sites (/call-sites ) - To find where functions are called without tracking data flow, use this simpler skill instead

  • decompiler (/decompiler ) - View decompiled code to understand function logic before setting up complex dataflow annotations

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