security

Elixir/Phoenix Security Reference

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Install skill "security" with this command: npx skills add oliver-kriska/claude-elixir-phoenix/oliver-kriska-claude-elixir-phoenix-security

Elixir/Phoenix Security Reference

Quick reference for security patterns in Elixir/Phoenix.

Iron Laws — Never Violate These

  • VALIDATE AT BOUNDARIES — Never trust client input. All data through changesets

  • NEVER INTERPOLATE USER INPUT — Use Ecto's ^ operator, never string interpolation

  • NO String.to_atom WITH USER INPUT — Atom exhaustion DoS. Use to_existing_atom/1

  • AUTHORIZE EVERYWHERE — Check in contexts AND re-validate in LiveView events

  • ESCAPE BY DEFAULT — Never use raw/1 with untrusted content

  • SECRETS NEVER IN CODE — All secrets in runtime.exs from env vars

Quick Patterns

Timing-Safe Authentication

def authenticate(email, password) do user = Repo.get_by(User, email: email)

cond do user && Argon2.verify_pass(password, user.hashed_password) -> {:ok, user} user -> {:error, :invalid_credentials} true -> Argon2.no_user_verify() # Timing attack prevention {:error, :invalid_credentials} end end

LiveView Authorization (CRITICAL)

RE-AUTHORIZE IN EVERY EVENT HANDLER

def handle_event("delete", %{"id" => id}, socket) do post = Blog.get_post!(id)

Don't trust that mount authorized this action!

with :ok <- Bodyguard.permit(Blog, :delete_post, socket.assigns.current_user, post) do Blog.delete_post(post) {:noreply, stream_delete(socket, :posts, post)} else _ -> {:noreply, put_flash(socket, :error, "Unauthorized")} end end

SQL Injection Prevention

✅ SAFE: Parameterized queries

from(u in User, where: u.name == ^user_input)

❌ VULNERABLE: String interpolation

from(u in User, where: fragment("name = '#{user_input}'"))

Quick Decisions

What to validate?

  • All user input → Ecto changesets

  • File uploads → Extension + magic bytes + size

  • Paths → Path.safe_relative/2 for traversal

  • Atoms → String.to_existing_atom/1 only

What to escape?

  • HTML output → Auto-escaped by default (<%= %> )

  • User HTML → HtmlSanitizeEx with scrubber

  • Never → raw/1 with untrusted content

Anti-patterns

Wrong Right

"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '#{name}'"

from(u in User, where: u.name == ^name)

String.to_atom(user_input)

String.to_existing_atom(user_input)

<%= raw @user_comment %>

<%= @user_comment %>

Hardcoded secrets in config runtime.exs from env vars

Auth only in mount Re-auth in every handle_event

References

For detailed patterns, see:

  • references/authentication.md

  • phx.gen.auth, MFA, sessions

  • references/authorization.md

  • Bodyguard, scopes, LiveView auth

  • references/input-validation.md

  • Changesets, file uploads, paths

  • references/security-headers.md

  • CSP, CSRF, rate limiting, headers

  • references/oauth-linking.md

  • OAuth account linking, token management

  • references/rate-limiting.md

  • Composite key strategies, Hammer patterns

  • references/advanced-patterns.md

  • SSRF prevention, secrets management, supply chain

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