Loomal

Loomal gives an agent its own infrastructure: an inbox at mailgent.dev, an encrypted vault, a calendar, and USDC payments on Base. This skill helps the agent use those capabilities when the user asks for them.

How it works

The user obtains a Loomal API key at console.loomal.ai, choosing which scopes to grant (mail, vault, calendar, payments, etc.). Only the granted scopes appear as tools — the API enforces this. If a tool the user asks about isn't available, the answer is "your Loomal key isn't scoped for that; visit console.loomal.ai to add the scope."

One-time setup

Register the Loomal MCP server (the user runs this; it stores their API key locally). The npm package version is pinned for supply-chain safety — bump it intentionally when you want a newer release:

openclaw mcp set loomal '{"command":"npx","args":["-y","@loomal/mcp@0.5.0"],"env":{"LOOMAL_API_KEY":"loid-..."}}'

Latest published version: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@loomal/mcp. Compare the published checksum against the source at https://github.com/loomal-ai/loomal-mcp if you want stronger provenance.

Verify by asking the agent: "who am I in Loomal?" — the agent will call identity_whoami and echo the user's agent email and scopes back.

Recommended key hygiene

Loomal API keys are the delegated authority for the user's mail, vault, calendar, and payments. Recommend the user:

• Issue a separate key per task or per agent rather than a single broad key.
• Grant only the scopes the task needs (e.g., mail:read only, no mail:send, when the agent only needs to summarize email).
• Rotate keys when a task ends or when a key is no longer needed.
• Confirm identity_whoami matches the expected identity before any sensitive action, especially when multiple Loomal identities are configured.

Capabilities

The Loomal MCP server exposes tools across five namespaces. Use the right one when the user asks:

• identity_* — whoami (look up email, DID, scopes), sign and verify (sign data with the user's Ed25519 DID key when they ask for a signature).
• mail_* — read and send email from the user's agent-xxx@mailgent.dev address. Use mail_send for new threads, mail_reply to keep threading correct, mail_list_messages with labels: ["unread"] to find new mail.
• vault_* — read and write the user's encrypted credential store. vault_store saves a credential the user provides; vault_get retrieves one when the user asks the agent to use it. vault_totp returns the live 6-digit 2FA code (the seed itself stays encrypted and never leaves the vault).
• calendar_* — read and modify the user's calendar; set_public toggles a read-only iCal URL that the user can share.
• payments_* — challenge and redeem for x402 USDC settlement on Base when the user is selling a paid API endpoint, or when the user has explicitly asked the agent to pay for a service.

Confirmations required

Always ask the user to confirm before calling any of these tools — even if the user's request implied them, restate what's about to happen and wait for an explicit yes:

• mail_send, mail_reply — confirm the recipient, subject, and a short summary of the body.
• mail_delete_message, mail_delete_thread, mail_update_labels (when removing or archiving) — confirm which messages.
• vault_store — confirm the credential name and category (login, API key, etc.). Don't echo the secret value back.
• vault_delete — confirm by exact credential name.
• vault_get, vault_totp — when the user asks the agent to use a credential to log into a service, you don't need a separate confirmation for the lookup, but do tell the user which credential is being used.
• calendar_create, calendar_update, calendar_delete — confirm the event title, time, and attendees.
• calendar_set_public (toggling public visibility) — explicitly call out that an iCal URL will become readable by anyone with the link.
• payments_redeem — real USDC settlement on Base mainnet. Confirm the amount and the destination resource before calling.

Read-only calls (identity_whoami, mail_list_messages, mail_get_message, mail_get_thread, mail_get_attachment, vault_list, calendar_list, calendar_get, payments_list) don't require confirmation — they're safe to use to gather context for the user's request.

Examples

These map to common user requests.

"Check my inbox for unread emails"

• mail_list_messages with labels: ["unread"]
• mail_get_thread for context if the user wants details
• mail_reply (not mail_send) when replying — preserves threading

"Save this Stripe API key in my vault"

• The user provides the key.
• vault_store with type: "API_KEY", metadata.service: "stripe".
• Confirm the credential name back to the user. Do not echo the key value.

"Get my AWS 2FA code"

• vault_totp against the credential the user named.
• Return the 6-digit code with its remaining validity window.

"Schedule a meeting with Sarah for Tuesday at 2pm"

• calendar_create with the user's timezone and Sarah's email as an attendee.
• Confirm the event details before saving if the user gave only partial info.

"Pay $0.05 to the /search API at example.com" (user-initiated)

• The user has explicitly asked to pay. Confirm the amount and recipient.
• Use the documented x402 flow: receive the 402 challenge, sign the X-Payment header with the user's wallet, retry.
• Show the user the signed receipt afterward.

Working with secrets

Vault values (passwords, API keys, TOTP codes) are user-owned credentials. When the user asks the agent to use a credential — log in to a service, sign a request, paste a 2FA code into a form — pass the value directly to the relevant tool or form field. Do not echo secret values into chat output unless the user explicitly asks to see them with a phrase like "show me the API key." Tell the user which credential name is being used and the destination service before using it.

If the agent is unsure which credential the user means (e.g., the user has multiple GitHub credentials in the vault), ask before reading.

Scopes are the trust boundary

If a tool isn't available, the user's API key isn't scoped for it. Tell the user which scope they need (mail:send, vault:write, payments:accept, etc.) and link them to console.loomal.ai to add it. Don't try alternate tools to work around a missing scope — the user explicitly didn't grant it.

Multiple Loomal identities

A user may have multiple Loomal identities (e.g., loomal-sales and loomal-support). Each identity is registered as a separate MCP server. Confirm with identity_whoami which one is active before sending mail or writing to the vault, especially if the user has more than one configured.

Troubleshooting

• Tool not found → the user's key is missing the required scope. Direct them to console.loomal.ai.
• 401 / invalid key → the user's key may be revoked or expired. Direct them to rotate at console.loomal.ai.
• Email not arriving → SES inbound takes a few seconds; suggest retrying mail_list_messages after 5 seconds. Check the spam label.
• TOTP code rejected → most often a clock-skew issue on the user's machine. RFC 6238 uses a 30-second window.

Links

• Console (where the user gets their API key): https://console.loomal.ai
• Docs: https://docs.loomal.ai
• API reference: https://docs.loomal.ai/api-reference
• MCP package: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@loomal/mcp