Security Audit Skill
A comprehensive, manual deep code audit protocol for security-critical systems. Includes fast "Vibe Coding Guardrails" for the most common AI-assisted development pitfalls.
When to Use
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Before major releases
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Security review requests
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Auditing authentication/payment flows
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When "audit" or "security" is mentioned
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After scaffolding a new project with AI (vibe coding sanity check)
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Before first deploy of any user-facing app
Audit Phases
Phase 0: Scope Definition
Define boundaries:
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FULL_SCAN: Entire codebase
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FEATURE_SCAN: Specific feature (docs/features/[Name].md )
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DIFF_SCAN: git diff --staged or git diff HEAD~1
Phase 1: The Detective (Static Analysis)
1. Detect package manager & run dependency audit
Auto-detect: check which lockfile exists
pnpm-lock.yaml → pnpm audit
package-lock.json → npm audit
yarn.lock → yarn audit
bun.lockb → bun pm audit (or bunx audit)
pnpm audit # ← swap for your package manager
2. Secret scanning (use jstar if available)
jstar detect
3. Manual grep patterns:
Secrets
grep -rE "(api_key|secret|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*['"`][a-zA-Z0-9_-.]{10,}['"`]"
RCE/Injection
grep -rE "(dangerouslySetInnerHTML|eval(|exec(|.queryRaw)"
Debugging
grep -rE "(console.log|debugger|todo)"
Phase 1.5: Vibe Coding Guardrails (AI-Specific Checks)
These are fast, proactive checks that catch the most common vibe-coding security mistakes. Run these before deep analysis. Each takes ~2 minutes.
1.5.1 — Ghost/Phantom Package Detection (Supply Chain)
Risk: AI models hallucinate package names. Attackers register malware under those names.
Note: npm view queries the npm registry directly and works regardless of your package manager (pnpm, yarn, bun, etc.). You don't need npm installed — it's just a registry lookup.
For each unfamiliar dependency in package.json:
1. Verify it exists on the real registry (works with ANY package manager)
npm view <package-name> version # Should return a version, not 404
Alt for pnpm users: pnpm info <package-name>
Alt for bun users: bunx npm-cli view <package-name>
2. Check download stats (low downloads = suspicious)
npm view <package-name> --json | grep -E "downloads|modified"
3. Look for typosquatting (e.g., "lodahs" instead of "lodash")
Compare against known-good package names
Action: Remove any package that doesn't exist on npm/PyPI or has suspiciously low downloads. Cross-reference with the official docs.
1.5.2 — AI-Built Auth Detection
Risk: AI happily generates custom login systems that look like they work but have invisible holes (no CSRF, weak hashing, no session expiry, etc.).
Scan for custom auth patterns (red flags):
grep -rE "(bcrypt.hash|jwt.sign|createHash|crypto.createCipher)" --include=".ts" --include=".tsx" --include=".js" grep -rE "(password.=.req.(body|query)|session[|cookie[)" --include=".ts" --include=".tsx" --include=".js"
Check if a battle-tested auth provider is installed:
grep -E "(next-auth|@auth/|@clerk|@supabase/auth|auth0|lucia|better-auth)" package.json
Action: If custom auth is found AND no established provider exists:
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Flag as HIGH severity
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Recommend migration to: Clerk, NextAuth/Auth.js, Supabase Auth, Auth0, Lucia, or Better Auth
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Custom auth is only acceptable if the team has dedicated security expertise
1.5.3 — .gitignore Verification
Risk: Vibe coding moves fast. One missing .gitignore entry = secrets pushed to public GitHub. Bots scan for exposed keys 24/7.
1. Check .gitignore exists
test -f .gitignore && echo "EXISTS" || echo "MISSING — CRITICAL"
2. Verify essential entries are present:
for pattern in ".env" ".env.local" ".env..local" "node_modules" ".pem" "*.key" ".DS_Store"; do grep -qF "$pattern" .gitignore || echo "MISSING from .gitignore: $pattern" done
3. Check if .env is already tracked (damage already done):
git ls-files --cached | grep -E ".env$|.env.local$|.pem$|.key$"
If output exists → secrets are already in git history. Rotate ALL keys immediately.
Action: If .gitignore is missing or incomplete → flag as CRITICAL. If .env is already tracked → CRITICAL + recommend git filter-branch or BFG Repo-Cleaner
- immediate key rotation.
1.5.4 — Rate Limiting Check
Risk: Any public API route without rate limiting = bots will abuse it (spam, brute force, API cost drain).
Check if rate limiting middleware is installed:
grep -E "(rate-limit|@upstash/ratelimit|express-rate-limit|limiter)" package.json
Check if it's actually applied to API routes:
grep -rE "(rateLimit|rateLimiter|Ratelimit|slidingWindow)" --include=".ts" --include=".tsx" --include="*.js" src/app/api/ app/api/ pages/api/
Action: If no rate limiter is found on public API routes:
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Flag as HIGH severity
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Recommend: @upstash/ratelimit (serverless), express-rate-limit (Express), or custom middleware
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Minimum: 100 requests/hour/IP for forms, 10 requests/minute for auth endpoints
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AI-powered endpoints (LLM calls) should have even stricter limits to prevent cost attacks
1.5.5 — Row Level Security (RLS) Check
Risk: By default, databases let anyone see everyone's data. Forgetting RLS = instant data leak.
Check if Supabase is used (most common vibe-coding DB):
grep -E "(supabase|@supabase)" package.json
If Supabase: verify RLS is mentioned in migration files or setup:
grep -rE "(enable_rls|row_level_security|CREATE POLICY|ALTER TABLE.ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY)" --include=".sql" --include="*.ts"
For Prisma: check for tenant/user scoping in queries:
grep -rE "where:.*userId|where:.user_id|where:.tenantId" --include=".ts" --include=".tsx"
For raw SQL: check for user-scoped WHERE clauses:
grep -rE "(SELECT|UPDATE|DELETE).FROM" --include=".ts" --include="*.tsx" | grep -v "WHERE.*user"
Action: If database is used but no RLS/user-scoping is found:
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Flag as CRITICAL severity
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For Supabase: Enable RLS on ALL tables, create policies for SELECT , INSERT , UPDATE , DELETE
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For Prisma/raw SQL: Ensure every query that touches user data includes a userId /tenantId filter
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Rule of thumb: If a user can see another user's data, it's a data breach
Phase 2: The Graph (Data Flow)
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Identify Entry Points (Routes, Actions, CLI)
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Trace Input: User input → Service → Database
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Verify Validation: Zod/Typebox at edge boundaries
Phase 3: The Auditor (Spec vs Code)
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Read docs/features/*.md for scope
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Gap Analysis: Features in Docs but missing in Code
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Orphan Analysis: Code not in Docs (zombie code)
Phase 4: The Judge (Logic Probing)
Pick highest-risk file and simulate:
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"What if I send null ? Empty string? Negative ID?"
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"What if two requests hit this at once?" (race conditions)
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"Can I access this Service function directly?" (auth bypass)
Phase 5: The Architect (Quality)
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Performance: await in loops → N+1 queries
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Bloat: Files > 200 lines? Functions > 50 lines?
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Types: Any use of any or as unknown ?
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Structure: Feature-Sliced Design compliance?
Phase 6: Report
Create .jstar/audit_report.md :
Severity Category Location Issue Recommendation
CRITICAL SECURITY api/auth
... ...
HIGH LOGIC service.ts:42
... ...
HIGH GUARDRAIL package.json
No rate limiter installed Add @upstash/ratelimit
Severities: CRITICAL , HIGH , WARNING , INFO
Categories: SECURITY , LOGIC , COMPLETENESS , QUALITY , GUARDRAIL
Phase 7: Remediation
For each CRITICAL/HIGH:
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Implement fix
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Run build/tests
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Re-verify with grep/logic check
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Stage changes