Risk Management Specialist
ISO 14971:2019 risk management implementation throughout the medical device lifecycle.
Table of Contents
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Risk Management Planning Workflow
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Risk Analysis Workflow
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Risk Evaluation Workflow
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Risk Control Workflow
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Post-Production Risk Management
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Risk Assessment Templates
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Decision Frameworks
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Tools and References
Risk Management Planning Workflow
Establish risk management process per ISO 14971.
Workflow: Create Risk Management Plan
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Define scope of risk management activities:
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Medical device identification
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Lifecycle stages covered
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Applicable standards and regulations
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Establish risk acceptability criteria:
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Define probability categories (P1-P5)
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Define severity categories (S1-S5)
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Create risk matrix with acceptance thresholds
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Assign responsibilities:
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Risk management lead
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Subject matter experts
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Approval authorities
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Define verification activities:
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Methods for control verification
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Acceptance criteria
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Plan production and post-production activities:
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Information sources
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Review triggers
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Update procedures
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Obtain plan approval
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Establish risk management file
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Validation: Plan approved; acceptability criteria defined; responsibilities assigned; file established
Risk Management Plan Content
Section Content Evidence
Scope Device and lifecycle coverage Scope statement
Criteria Risk acceptability matrix Risk matrix document
Responsibilities Roles and authorities RACI chart
Verification Methods and acceptance Verification plan
Production/Post-Production Monitoring activities Surveillance plan
Risk Acceptability Matrix (5x5)
Probability \ Severity Negligible Minor Serious Critical Catastrophic
Frequent (P5) Medium High High Unacceptable Unacceptable
Probable (P4) Medium Medium High High Unacceptable
Occasional (P3) Low Medium Medium High High
Remote (P2) Low Low Medium Medium High
Improbable (P1) Low Low Low Medium Medium
Risk Level Actions
Level Acceptable Action Required
Low Yes Document and accept
Medium ALARP Reduce if practicable; document rationale
High ALARP Reduction required; demonstrate ALARP
Unacceptable No Design change mandatory
Risk Analysis Workflow
Identify hazards and estimate risks systematically.
Workflow: Conduct Risk Analysis
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Define intended use and reasonably foreseeable misuse:
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Medical indication
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Patient population
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User population
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Use environment
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Select analysis method(s):
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FMEA for component/function analysis
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FTA for system-level analysis
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HAZOP for process deviations
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Use Error Analysis for user interaction
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Identify hazards by category:
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Energy hazards (electrical, mechanical, thermal)
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Biological hazards (bioburden, biocompatibility)
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Chemical hazards (residues, leachables)
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Operational hazards (software, use errors)
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Determine hazardous situations:
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Sequence of events
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Foreseeable misuse scenarios
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Single fault conditions
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Estimate probability of harm (P1-P5)
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Estimate severity of harm (S1-S5)
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Document in hazard analysis worksheet
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Validation: All hazard categories addressed; all hazards documented; probability and severity assigned
Hazard Categories Checklist
Category Examples Analyzed
Electrical Shock, burns, interference ☐
Mechanical Crushing, cutting, entrapment ☐
Thermal Burns, tissue damage ☐
Radiation Ionizing, non-ionizing ☐
Biological Infection, biocompatibility ☐
Chemical Toxicity, irritation ☐
Software Incorrect output, timing ☐
Use Error Misuse, perception, cognition ☐
Environment EMC, mechanical stress ☐
Analysis Method Selection
Situation Recommended Method
Component failures FMEA
System-level failure FTA
Process deviations HAZOP
User interaction Use Error Analysis
Software behavior Software FMEA
Early design phase PHA
Probability Criteria
Level Name Description Frequency
P5 Frequent Expected to occur
10⁻³
P4 Probable Likely to occur 10⁻³ to 10⁻⁴
P3 Occasional May occur 10⁻⁴ to 10⁻⁵
P2 Remote Unlikely 10⁻⁵ to 10⁻⁶
P1 Improbable Very unlikely <10⁻⁶
Severity Criteria
Level Name Description Harm
S5 Catastrophic Death Death
S4 Critical Permanent impairment Irreversible injury
S3 Serious Injury requiring intervention Reversible injury
S2 Minor Temporary discomfort No treatment needed
S1 Negligible Inconvenience No injury
See: references/risk-analysis-methods.md
Risk Evaluation Workflow
Evaluate risks against acceptability criteria.
Workflow: Evaluate Identified Risks
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Calculate initial risk level from probability × severity
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Compare to risk acceptability criteria
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For each risk, determine:
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Acceptable: Document and accept
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ALARP: Proceed to risk control
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Unacceptable: Mandatory risk control
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Document evaluation rationale
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Identify risks requiring benefit-risk analysis
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Complete benefit-risk analysis if applicable
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Compile risk evaluation summary
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Validation: All risks evaluated; acceptability determined; rationale documented
Risk Evaluation Decision Tree
Risk Estimated │ ▼ Apply Acceptability Criteria │ ├── Low Risk ──────────► Accept and document │ ├── Medium Risk ───────► Consider risk reduction │ │ Document ALARP if not reduced │ ▼ │ Practicable to reduce? │ │ │ Yes──► Implement control │ No───► Document ALARP rationale │ ├── High Risk ─────────► Risk reduction required │ │ Must demonstrate ALARP │ ▼ │ Implement control │ Verify residual risk │ └── Unacceptable ──────► Design change mandatory Cannot proceed without control
ALARP Demonstration Requirements
Criterion Evidence Required
Technical feasibility Analysis of alternative controls
Proportionality Cost-benefit of further reduction
State of the art Comparison to similar devices
Stakeholder input Clinical/user perspectives
Benefit-Risk Analysis Triggers
Situation Benefit-Risk Required
Residual risk remains high Yes
No feasible risk reduction Yes
Novel device Yes
Unacceptable risk with clinical benefit Yes
All risks low No
Risk Control Workflow
Implement and verify risk control measures.
Workflow: Implement Risk Controls
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Identify risk control options:
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Inherent safety by design (Priority 1)
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Protective measures in device (Priority 2)
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Information for safety (Priority 3)
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Select optimal control following hierarchy
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Analyze control for new hazards introduced
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Document control in design requirements
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Implement control in design
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Develop verification protocol
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Execute verification and document results
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Evaluate residual risk with control in place
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Validation: Control implemented; verification passed; residual risk acceptable; no unaddressed new hazards
Risk Control Hierarchy
Priority Control Type Examples Effectiveness
1 Inherent Safety Eliminate hazard, fail-safe design Highest
2 Protective Measures Guards, alarms, automatic shutdown High
3 Information Warnings, training, IFU Lower
Risk Control Option Analysis Template
RISK CONTROL OPTION ANALYSIS
Hazard ID: H-[XXX] Hazard: [Description] Initial Risk: P[X] × S[X] = [Level]
OPTIONS CONSIDERED:
| Option | Control Type | New Hazards | Feasibility | Selected |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | [Type] | [Yes/No] | [H/M/L] | [Yes/No] |
| 2 | [Type] | [Yes/No] | [H/M/L] | [Yes/No] |
SELECTED CONTROL: Option [X] Rationale: [Justification for selection]
IMPLEMENTATION:
- Requirement: [REQ-XXX]
- Design Document: [Reference]
VERIFICATION:
- Method: [Test/Analysis/Review]
- Protocol: [Reference]
- Acceptance Criteria: [Criteria]
Risk Control Verification Methods
Method When to Use Evidence
Test Quantifiable performance Test report
Inspection Physical presence Inspection record
Analysis Design calculation Analysis report
Review Documentation check Review record
Residual Risk Evaluation
After Control Action
Acceptable Document, proceed
ALARP achieved Document rationale, proceed
Still unacceptable Additional control or design change
New hazard introduced Analyze and control new hazard
Post-Production Risk Management
Monitor and update risk management throughout product lifecycle.
Workflow: Post-Production Risk Monitoring
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Identify information sources:
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Customer complaints
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Service reports
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Vigilance/adverse events
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Literature monitoring
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Clinical studies
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Establish collection procedures
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Define review triggers:
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New hazard identified
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Increased frequency of known hazard
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Serious incident
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Regulatory feedback
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Analyze incoming information for risk relevance
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Update risk management file as needed
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Communicate significant findings
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Conduct periodic risk management review
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Validation: Information sources monitored; file current; reviews completed per schedule
Information Sources
Source Information Type Review Frequency
Complaints Use issues, failures Continuous
Service Field failures, repairs Monthly
Vigilance Serious incidents Immediate
Literature Similar device issues Quarterly
Regulatory Authority feedback As received
Clinical PMCF data Per plan
Risk Management File Update Triggers
Trigger Response Time Action
Serious incident Immediate Full risk review
New hazard identified 30 days Risk analysis update
Trend increase 60 days Trend analysis
Design change Before implementation Impact assessment
Standards update Per transition period Gap analysis
Periodic Review Requirements
Review Element Frequency
Risk management file completeness Annual
Risk control effectiveness Annual
Post-market information analysis Quarterly
Risk-benefit conclusions Annual or on new data
Risk Assessment Templates
Hazard Analysis Worksheet
HAZARD ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
Product: [Device Name] Document: HA-[Product]-[Rev] Analyst: [Name] Date: [Date]
| ID | Hazard | Hazardous Situation | Harm | P | S | Initial Risk | Control | Residual P | Residual S | Final Risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| H-001 | [Hazard] | [Situation] | [Harm] | [1-5] | [1-5] | [Level] | [Control ref] | [1-5] | [1-5] | [Level] |
FMEA Worksheet
FMEA WORKSHEET
Product: [Device Name] Subsystem: [Subsystem] Analyst: [Name] Date: [Date]
| ID | Item | Function | Failure Mode | Effect | S | Cause | O | Control | D | RPN | Action |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FM-001 | [Item] | [Function] | [Mode] | [Effect] | [1-10] | [Cause] | [1-10] | [Detection] | [1-10] | [S×O×D] | [Action] |
RPN Action Thresholds:
200: Critical - Immediate action 100-200: High - Action plan required 50-100: Medium - Consider action <50: Low - Monitor
Risk Management Report Summary
RISK MANAGEMENT REPORT
Product: [Device Name] Date: [Date] Revision: [X.X]
SUMMARY:
- Total hazards identified: [N]
- Risk controls implemented: [N]
- Residual risks: [N] Low, [N] Medium, [N] High
- Overall conclusion: [Acceptable / Not Acceptable]
RISK DISTRIBUTION:
| Risk Level | Before Control | After Control |
|---|---|---|
| Unacceptable | [N] | 0 |
| High | [N] | [N] |
| Medium | [N] | [N] |
| Low | [N] | [N] |
CONTROLS IMPLEMENTED:
- Inherent safety: [N]
- Protective measures: [N]
- Information for safety: [N]
OVERALL RESIDUAL RISK: [Acceptable / ALARP Demonstrated] BENEFIT-RISK CONCLUSION: [If applicable]
APPROVAL: Risk Management Lead: _____________ Date: _______ Quality Assurance: _____________ Date: _______
Decision Frameworks
Risk Control Selection
What is the risk level? │ ├── Unacceptable ──► Can hazard be eliminated? │ │ │ Yes─┴─No │ │ │ │ ▼ ▼ │ Eliminate Can protective │ hazard measure reduce? │ │ │ Yes─┴─No │ │ │ │ ▼ ▼ │ Add Add warning │ protection + training │ └── High/Medium ──► Apply hierarchy starting at Level 1
New Hazard Analysis
Question If Yes If No
Does control introduce new hazard? Analyze new hazard Proceed
Is new risk higher than original? Reject control option Acceptable trade-off
Can new hazard be controlled? Add control Reject control option
Risk Acceptability Decision
Condition Decision
All risks Low Acceptable
Medium risks with ALARP Acceptable
High risks with ALARP documented Acceptable if benefits outweigh
Any Unacceptable residual Not acceptable - redesign
Tools and References
Scripts
Tool Purpose Usage
risk_matrix_calculator.py Calculate risk levels and FMEA RPN python risk_matrix_calculator.py --help
Risk Matrix Calculator Features:
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ISO 14971 5x5 risk matrix calculation
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FMEA RPN (Risk Priority Number) calculation
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Interactive mode for guided assessment
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Display risk criteria definitions
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JSON output for integration
References
Document Content
iso14971-implementation-guide.md Complete ISO 14971:2019 implementation with templates
risk-analysis-methods.md FMEA, FTA, HAZOP, Use Error Analysis methods
Quick Reference: ISO 14971 Process
Stage Key Activities Output
Planning Define scope, criteria, responsibilities Risk Management Plan
Analysis Identify hazards, estimate risk Hazard Analysis
Evaluation Compare to criteria, ALARP assessment Risk Evaluation
Control Implement hierarchy, verify Risk Control Records
Residual Overall assessment, benefit-risk Risk Management Report
Production Monitor, review, update Updated RM File
Related Skills
Skill Integration Point
quality-manager-qms-iso13485 QMS integration
capa-officer Risk-based CAPA
regulatory-affairs-head Regulatory submissions
quality-documentation-manager Risk file management
AI-Specific Risk Management (ISO 14971 + AI Risk Considerations)
AI/ML Medical Device Risk Categories
Traditional ISO 14971 hazard categories must be extended for AI/ML-based devices:
AI-Specific Hazard Description Severity Potential Detection Difficulty
Model bias Discriminatory outputs across patient subgroups S3-S5 (misdiagnosis) High — requires subgroup analysis
Data drift Input data distribution shifts from training data S2-S4 (degraded performance) Medium — requires monitoring
Concept drift Clinical ground truth changes over time S3-S5 (outdated predictions) High — requires clinical validation
Adversarial inputs Intentionally crafted inputs to deceive model S2-S5 (incorrect output) High — requires adversarial testing
Hallucination/confabulation Plausible but incorrect outputs S3-S5 (false diagnosis) Medium — requires output validation
Training data poisoning Corrupted training data leads to systematic errors S3-S5 Very High — requires data provenance
Automation complacency Users over-trust AI outputs S3-S5 (missed clinical findings) Medium — requires human factors study
AI Risk Analysis Methodology
Step 1: AI System Characterization → Define intended use, user population, clinical context → Classify: locked algorithm vs. adaptive vs. continuously learning → Map to SaMD risk framework (IMDRF)
Step 2: AI-Specific Hazard Identification → Apply standard ISO 14971 hazard categories → ADD: data quality hazards, algorithmic hazards, integration hazards → Consider: training data representativeness, edge cases, failure modes
Step 3: AI Failure Mode Analysis → Extend FMEA with AI-specific failure modes: - False positive/negative beyond acceptable rates - Performance degradation over time - Out-of-distribution input handling - Feature importance shift → For each failure mode: determine harm pathway to patient
Step 4: AI-Specific Risk Controls → Confidence thresholds (reject uncertain predictions) → Human-in-the-loop for high-risk decisions → Input validation and out-of-distribution detection → Continuous performance monitoring with drift detection → Automated model retraining safeguards → Fail-safe modes when AI system is unavailable
Step 5: AI Risk Monitoring Plan → Define performance metrics and acceptable thresholds → Establish monitoring frequency (real-time, daily, weekly) → Define retraining triggers and validation requirements → Plan for model versioning and rollback procedures
AI Risk Acceptability Considerations
Risk Factor Additional Consideration for AI
Probability Include statistical confidence intervals for model performance
Severity Consider both direct harm and harm from delayed correct treatment
Detectability Factor in opacity of AI decision-making (explainability)
Benefit Quantify clinical benefit vs. non-AI alternative
ALARP State-of-the-art includes current AI best practices (GMLP)
Cybersecurity Risk Integration (IEC 81001-5-1)
Health Software Cybersecurity Risk Management
IEC 81001-5-1:2021 establishes cybersecurity lifecycle requirements for health software. Integrate with ISO 14971:
ISO 14971 Stage IEC 81001-5-1 Integration Combined Output
Risk Management Plan Include cybersecurity scope, threat modeling methodology Combined RM + cybersecurity plan
Hazard identification Add cybersecurity threat identification (STRIDE, attack trees) Extended hazard analysis with cyber threats
Risk estimation Estimate probability based on threat landscape and exploitability Risk register with cyber-specific likelihood factors
Risk control Implement security controls as risk mitigations Controls traceable to both safety and security risks
Residual risk Evaluate residual cybersecurity risk Combined residual risk assessment
Post-production Monitor threat landscape, CVE databases, incident reports Integrated PMS + security monitoring
Cybersecurity Threat Categories for Medical Devices
Threat Category Examples ISO 14971 Harm Pathway
Unauthorized access Credential theft, privilege escalation Modification of device settings → patient harm
Data breach PHI exfiltration, ransomware Loss of data availability → delayed treatment
Denial of service Network flooding, resource exhaustion Device unavailable → delayed diagnosis/treatment
Malware Ransomware, trojans, supply chain compromise Device malfunction → incorrect output
Data integrity Man-in-the-middle, data manipulation Corrupted clinical data → incorrect treatment
Supply chain Compromised dependencies, malicious updates Backdoor access → any harm pathway
Cybersecurity FMEA Extension
Add these columns to standard FMEA for cybersecurity failure modes:
CYBERSECURITY FMEA EXTENSION
| ID | Component | Security Function | Threat | Attack Vector | Exploitability | Impact | S | O | D | RPN | Security Control |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CS-001 | Auth module | User authentication | Credential theft | Phishing | High (8) | Full access | 8 | 6 | 4 | 192 | MFA + session management |
| CS-002 | Data store | Data confidentiality | SQL injection | Network input | Medium (5) | Data breach | 9 | 4 | 3 | 108 | Parameterized queries + WAF |
| CS-003 | Update mechanism | Integrity | Supply chain | Compromised update | Low (3) | Malware install | 10 | 2 | 7 | 140 | Code signing + integrity verification |
Supply Chain Risk Management
Medical Device Supply Chain Risks
Risk Category Description Probability Impact Control Strategy
Single-source component Critical component from sole supplier Medium Critical Dual-source qualification, safety stock
Counterfeit components Fraudulent parts entering supply chain Low-Medium Catastrophic Supplier audits, incoming inspection, chain of custody
Supplier quality failure Supplier QMS breakdown Medium High Supplier qualification, periodic audits, quality agreements
Software dependency Vulnerable or unsupported open-source library High Medium-High SBOM management, vulnerability scanning, update policy
Geopolitical disruption Sanctions, trade restrictions, supply interruption Low-Medium High Geographic diversification, buffer inventory
Raw material shortage Rare earth, specialty materials unavailability Low High Alternative material qualification, forward contracts
Supply Chain Risk Assessment Workflow
Step 1: Supply Chain Mapping → Identify all direct suppliers (Tier 1) → Map critical Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers → Document component criticality (safety-critical, quality-critical, standard)
Step 2: Supplier Risk Scoring → Quality risk: past performance, certification status, audit results → Financial risk: stability, dependency on your business → Geographic risk: natural disaster, political stability → Cyber risk: supplier's information security posture → Concentration risk: single-source, regional concentration
Step 3: Risk Treatment → Critical suppliers: quality agreements, annual audits, dual-sourcing → High-risk suppliers: enhanced monitoring, contingency plans → Medium-risk suppliers: periodic review, performance metrics → Low-risk suppliers: standard purchasing controls
Step 4: Ongoing Monitoring → Supplier scorecard tracking (quality, delivery, responsiveness) → Annual supplier risk reassessment → Trigger-based reassessment (quality event, financial change, M&A)
Post-Market Risk Monitoring Automation
Automated Signal Detection
Data Source Automation Approach Alert Threshold
Complaint database Statistical process control (SPC) charts on complaint rates
2 sigma deviation from baseline
Adverse event reports NLP-based classification + trend analysis Any serious event; trend >3x baseline
Literature monitoring Automated PubMed/regulatory database searches New publication on similar device adverse events
Field service data Automated failure rate tracking Failure rate exceeds design MTBF by >20%
Social media/forums Keyword monitoring for device-related complaints Cluster of similar complaints in 30-day window
Regulatory databases MAUDE, EUDAMED vigilance module, BfArM monitoring New recall or safety communication for similar device
Risk Management File Update Automation
Automated Trigger → Risk Review Decision Tree
New complaint received → Classify by hazard category (auto or manual) → Check: Known hazard? YES → Update frequency data → Recalculate risk level → Risk level changed? → Flag for risk management review NO → New hazard identified → Initiate risk analysis → Estimate initial risk → Determine controls needed → Update risk management file
Trend threshold exceeded → Generate trend report with statistical analysis → Convene risk management review within 30 days → Update risk management file with new probability estimates → Evaluate if additional risk controls needed → If safety issue: initiate FSCA/field action assessment
Cross-Reference: NIST Cybersecurity Framework Risk Assessment
Map ISO 14971 risk management to NIST CSF 2.0 for comprehensive risk coverage:
ISO 14971 Process NIST CSF 2.0 Function Integration Point
Hazard identification Identify (ID.RA) Combine clinical and cyber threat identification
Risk estimation Identify (ID.RA-03, ID.RA-04) Unified likelihood and impact scales
Risk evaluation Identify (ID.RA-05, ID.RA-06) Single risk register with combined acceptance criteria
Risk control Protect (PR), Detect (DE) Security controls as risk mitigations
Residual risk evaluation Govern (GV.RM) Combined residual risk statement
Post-production monitoring Detect (DE.CM, DE.AE) Unified monitoring for safety and security events
See also: ../information-security-manager-iso27001/SKILL.md for ISO 27001 security controls that serve as risk mitigations.
Cross-Reference: DORA ICT Risk Management
For medical device companies operating as or supplying to financial entities in the EU, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA, Regulation 2022/2554) adds ICT risk requirements:
DORA Requirement ISO 14971 Integration Action
ICT risk management framework (Art. 6) Extend risk management plan to include ICT risks Add ICT-specific risk categories to hazard analysis
ICT incident management (Art. 17) Align with post-production monitoring Unified incident classification and response
Digital operational resilience testing (Art. 24-27) Complement risk control verification Include penetration testing in verification activities
Third-party ICT risk (Art. 28-30) Extend supply chain risk management Assess ICT service providers per DORA requirements
Information sharing (Art. 45) Enhance post-market information sources Participate in threat intelligence sharing arrangements
Enhanced FMEA with Cybersecurity Failure Modes
Combined Safety-Security FMEA Template
COMBINED SAFETY-SECURITY FMEA
Product: [Device Name] Subsystem: [Subsystem] Date: [Date]
TRADITIONAL SAFETY FAILURE MODES:
| ID | Item | Function | Failure Mode | Effect | S | Cause | O | Detection | D | RPN | Control |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FM-001 | Sensor | Measure vital sign | Incorrect reading | Wrong diagnosis | 8 | Calibration drift | 4 | Self-test | 3 | 96 | Auto-calibration |
CYBERSECURITY FAILURE MODES:
| ID | Asset | Security Objective | Threat | Attack Vector | Exploitability (O) | Impact (S) | Detection (D) | RPN | Security Control |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CS-001 | Sensor data | Integrity | Data manipulation | MITM attack | 3 | 8 | 5 | 120 | TLS + data signing |
| CS-002 | Firmware | Integrity | Malicious update | Supply chain | 2 | 10 | 6 | 120 | Secure boot + code signing |
| CS-003 | User interface | Availability | DoS attack | Network flooding | 5 | 6 | 4 | 120 | Rate limiting + redundancy |
AI/ML FAILURE MODES (if applicable):
| ID | Component | ML Function | Failure Mode | Clinical Effect | S | Cause | O | Detection | D | RPN | ML Control |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AI-001 | Classifier | Diagnose condition | False negative | Missed diagnosis | 9 | Distribution shift | 4 | Performance monitoring | 5 | 180 | Drift detection + human review |
| AI-002 | Classifier | Diagnose condition | Biased output | Health disparity | 8 | Unrepresentative training data | 3 | Subgroup analysis | 6 | 144 | Fairness constraints + diverse data |
COMBINED RPN THRESHOLDS:
200: Critical — Immediate action required (all categories) 100-200: High — Action plan within 30 days 50-100: Medium — Monitor and consider action <50: Low — Accept and monitor
Cybersecurity-Safety Interaction Analysis
Safety Control Cybersecurity Impact Mitigation
Alarm system Alarm suppression via unauthorized access Access control + alarm integrity monitoring
Fail-safe mode Denial of service forcing perpetual safe mode Rate limiting + redundant communication
Software update Malicious update compromising safety function Code signing + dual authorization + rollback capability
Data logging Log tampering concealing safety events Append-only logs + cryptographic integrity
User authentication Lockout preventing emergency use Break-glass procedures + local override
Enhanced Risk Management — AI, Cybersecurity & Cross-Framework Integration
AI-Specific Risk Management
When managing risk for AI/ML medical devices, extend ISO 14971 with:
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AI Model Risk: Training data bias, model drift, adversarial attacks, explainability gaps
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Performance Degradation: Monitor for distribution shift, concept drift, and data quality issues
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Algorithmic Bias: Demographic parity, equalized odds, calibration across subgroups
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Human-AI Interaction Risks: Over-reliance, automation bias, alert fatigue, trust calibration
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Cross-reference: See eu-ai-act-specialist for EU AI Act risk classification
Cybersecurity Risk Integration (IEC 81001-5-1)
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Health Software Cybersecurity: IEC 81001-5-1 extends ISO 14971 for cybersecurity
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Threat Modeling: STRIDE methodology applied to medical device architecture
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Cybersecurity FMEA: Failure modes include unauthorized access, data breach, ransomware, supply chain attack
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Vulnerability Management: CVSS scoring integrated with ISO 14971 severity/probability matrix
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Cross-reference: See infrastructure-compliance-auditor for technical security checks
Supply Chain Risk Management
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Component Risk: Third-party software vulnerabilities (SBOM-based assessment)
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Supplier Risk: Single-source dependencies, geopolitical risks, quality history
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Cloud Risk: Data residency, service availability, vendor lock-in
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Cross-reference: See nis2-directive-specialist for NIS2 supply chain requirements
Cross-Framework Risk Mapping
Risk Area ISO 14971 NIST CSF 2.0 DORA NIS2
Risk Assessment Clause 4 ID.RA Art. 6 Art. 21.1
Risk Treatment Clause 7 PR (all) Art. 9 Art. 21.2
Monitoring Clause 9 DE.CM Art. 10 Art. 21.2.f
Incident Response Clause 9 RS.MA Art. 17 Art. 23
Continuous Improvement Clause 10 ID.IM Art. 13 Art. 21.2.f